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ABSTRACT

The theories of several contemporary management theorists are examined in order to demonstrate that their administrative stance is that of a person-intensive approach to management. After exploring leadership theory and the positions of Douglas McGregor, John J. Morse, Jay W. Lorsch, Rensis Likert, Bernard M. Bass, William Reddin, George H. Rice, Jr., and Dean W. Bishoprick, the relational theories of Paul Tillich and Martin Buber are analyzed. Additionally, the implications of person-centered management in the administration of organizations, including federal programs, are addressed. It is suggested that the contemporary management theorists all affirm the significance of the interpersonal dimension in the managerial-administrative milieu, but none of them address in any detail the groundwork for adopting such an approach or the implications of such an understanding. It is suggested that relational theory will promote understanding of administration and that taken together the theories of Tillich and Buber support and enhance one another. Tillich's relation of separation or estrangement is analogous to Buber's I-It relation, and Tillich's relation of reconciliation or "at-onement" is analogous to Buber's I-Thou relation. Implications for the management of federal programs include the importance of their demonstrating that persons are valued over things, and the need to avoid the hierarchical approach to management in favor of a collegial organizational structure. Organizational administration should be based on trust, surrender of aggressiveness, or concern for the other person's welfare, and should consider all staff as whole persons and relate to them as such. A bibliography is appended. (SW)

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PERSON-CENTERED MANAGEMENT IN PROJECT ADMINISTRATION

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Abstract

In the following presentation, I attempt to delineate the theories of several contemporary management theorists in order to demonstrate that their administrative stance--based on years of practical experience and study--is that of a person intensive approach to management. All of these nationally and internationally known theorists espouse what I call "Person-Centered Management" not only out of concern for the persons involved but also because they can verify that such management is more productive, efficient, and effective for the organization in the long run. Why is this so important to persons who direct federal programs? First, because the federal approach to such program management is bureaucratic throughout. Second, it is tacitly assumed that an autocratic, bureaucratic structure is the only viable organizational structure in terms of control and accountability. Third, many project directors have had little or no formal study or training in administration and automatically assume the autocratic stance in their own management style. Hence, if--as Likert, Argyris, McGregor, Hersey and Blanchard, Rice and Bishoprick, and others maintain--there are other more efficient, productive, humane, and effective approaches to management, then it would be to our benefit and to the benefit of the clients whom we serve for us to know of them and to utilize them. With all this in mind, I delineate the theories, attempt to describe the pre-suppositions upon which such theories are based, describe two relational models which can be used as the basis for such theories, and then briefly discuss the implications of person centered management in the administration of organizations which include federal programs no less than other complex organizations.

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In the following presentation, I attempt to delineate the theories of several contemporary management theorists in order to demonstrate that their administrative stance--based on years of practical experience and study--is that of a person intensive approach to management. All of these nationally and internationally known theorists espouse what I call person centered management not only out of concern for the persons involved but also because they can verify that such management is more productive, efficient, and effective for the organization in the long run. Why is this so important to persons who direct federal programs? First, because the federal approach to such program management is bureaucratic throughout. Second, it is tacitly assumed that an autocratic, bureaucratic structure is the only viable organizational structure in terms of control and accountability. Third, many project directors have had little or no formal study or training in administration and automatically assume the autocratic stance in their own management style. Hence, if--as Likert, Argyris, McGregor, Hersey and Blanchard, and others maintain--there are other more efficient, productive, humane, and effective approaches to management, then it would be to our benefit and to the benefit of the clients we serve for us to know of them and to utilize them. With all this in mind, I delineate the theories, attempt to describe the presuppositions upon which such theories are based, describe two relational models which can be used as the basis for such theories, and then briefly discuss the implications of person centered management in the administration of organizations which include federal programs no less than other complex organizations.

As I began to explore leadership theory and examined such positions as those of Morse and Lorsch, Bass, Reddin, McGregor, Likert, Rice and Bishop, and Hersey and Blanchard, I readily agreed with the common thesis which they all--either explicitly or implicitly--shared, namely, that the interpersonal relational dimension in the management-administrative milieu should be the most significant one, and that management behavior should be guided by relational and personal dynamics. Implicit in all their theories is the emphasis upon the significance of persons over "things," persons over programs, goals, and tasks. My position is congruent with theirs in this respect.

The position of Douglas McGregor (McGregor, 1960) is definitely that of one who stresses the importance of the personalistic dimension of the leader's task. McGregor's basic concept is that in every leader's relation with his subordinates he entertains one of two basic sets of assumptions. McGregor designates these as Theory X and Theory Y. Theory X assumes that the typical worker is lazy and prefers not to work, lacks ambition and would prefer not to be given responsibility, prefers to be led because he is passive in nature, must be persuaded and pushed, rewarded and punished, tightly supervised and controlled, if he is to perform as expected. Theory Y assumes that the worker approaches work as naturally as play. He finds work satisfying or punishing depending on the circumstances. The worker seeks responsibility, and enjoys

assuming it. He likes to exercise self-control and self-direction.

McGregor admits that indifferent workers do exist, but he contends that they have become this way because of the way they have been treated. He further admits that few managers hold totally to either theory; he makes the categorical distinctions for the purpose of clarity. The task of Theory Y managers is to build such a climate as expounded by their theory and so organize working relationships that employees can best attain their goals by directing their efforts toward corporate goals. Where Theory X encourages management by imposition, Theory Y facilitates management by collaboration, involvement, contribution and personal commitment.

Morse and Lorsch (Morse and Lorsch, 1970) develop a theory which proposes to go "Beyond Theory Y," but, in so doing, they imply the preference for an essentially personalistic or Theory Y approach when the organization, task, and persons involved will permit the utilization of such an approach. Morse and Lorsch go "beyond theory Y" in that they "propose that the most productive organization is one that fits the needs of its task and people in any particular situation" (Morse and Lorsch, 1970, p. 61). They propose, therefore, a "contingency theory" which attempts to effect a fit between task, organization and people. Such a proper fit seems to have an added advantage of developing a strong feeling of competence in the people involved. The theory, then, implicitly emphasizes the importance of the personalistic dimension, for a feeling of competence contributes to the feeling of personal worth which the individual would entertain toward himself.

Rensis Likert (Likert, 1961, 1967, 1971) deliberately and consciously emphasizes the personal dimension. He affirms that concern for developing supportive relationships is the distinguishing characteristic of the managers who are most productive. His analysis of leadership in American industry led him to assert that the managers and supervisors in American industry and government who are achieving the highest productivity and whose over-all performance is most impressive are developing a better system, or what he calls "a newer theory" of organization and management. Although Likert stresses that these successful managers have not yet integrated their principles into a theory of management, his proposal is that his development of "The Principle of Supportive Relationships" and its derivative can serve as the integrating principle of the newer theory of organization. The general pattern of operations of the highest-producing managers shows the following characteristics: a preponderance of favorable attitudes on the part of all members; the effective harnessing of all the major motivational forces; the development of a tightly knit, effectively functioning social system made up of interlocking work groups with a high degree of group loyalty among the members; measurements utilized primarily for self-evaluation and guidance rather than for superimposed control. Those most impressive managers consistently relate to their employees as persons, as human beings, rather than as entities utilized to get the work done. From these general characteristics, Likert develops his integrative principle, namely: "The leadership and other processes of the organization must be such as to ensure a maximum probability that in all interactions and all relationships with the organization each

member will, in the light of his background, values and expectations, view the experience as supportive and one which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance" (Likert, 1971, p. 286). The derivative from this principle, Likert maintains, is: "that management will make full use of the potential capacities of its human resources only when each person in an organization is a member of one or more effectively functioning work groups that have a high degree of group loyalty, effective skills of interaction and high-performance goals" (Likert, 1971, p. 288).

Bernard M. Bass (Bass, 1960) is another theorist who emphasizes the relational and personal dimension of leadership. In Leadership, Psychology and Organizational Behavior, Bass provides an extensive and intensive study of the general phenomenon of leadership. In developing his theory of leadership, he stresses that the purpose of theory is to promote understanding, and in doing so, it "provides the concepts and definitions which abstract the important elements in the observable phenomena we are interested in describing" (Bass, p. 445). Without groups there would not be leaders. Hence, Bass early defines a group as "a collection of individuals" (Bass, p. 39). His definition of leadership has as its central thrust the necessity of interaction among persons. He says: "Leadership is the observed effort of one member to change other members' behavior by altering the motivation of the other members or by changing their habits. If the leadership is successful, what is observed is a change in the member accepting the leadership" (Bass, p. 447).

William Reddin attempts to develop a contingency theory of management which will be applicable regardless of the myriad of managerial situations in which the manager will find himself. Stressing that the achievement of effectiveness is the manager's "only job," Reddin defines effectiveness as "the extent to which a manager achieves the output requirements of his position," for it is his contention that managerial effectiveness "has to be defined in terms of output rather than input, by what a manager achieves rather than what he does" (Reddin, 1970, p. 3). Reddin emphasizes that there are four basic managerial styles, each of which has a more effective and a concomitant less effective application. The "integrated" managerial style has its less effective embodiment in the "compromiser" and its more effective representative in the "executive." The "dedicated" style is least effective in the "autocrat" and most effective in the "benevolent autocrat." The "related" style becomes less effective in the "missionary" style but more effective in the "developer." Finally, the "separated" style of management is less effective in the "deserter" while finding its more effective managerial style in the person of the "bureaucrat." The style to be used depends upon the situation; neither is, in and of itself, more or less effective, but each of the four basic styles has a less effective equivalent and a more effective instantiation. The "correct" style depends on the situation, the components of which are organization, technology, superior, coworkers, and subordinates. But throughout his study, Reddin emphasizes that the relational oriented approach to management is preferable to the task oriented.

In Conceptual Models of Organization, George H. Rice, Jr. and Dean W. Bishoprick (Rice and Bishoprick, 1971) note that there will probably be a conflict between those who want to control the actions of others and those whom they want to control. They trace the shift of power from one to the other and also indicate how the form of organization shifts from raw, coercive autocracy on the one extreme to productive democracy on the other. Their study presents a variety of organizational models, "each of which can be used under appropriate conditions to either describe an existing organization and predict its behavior, or to serve as a blueprint for the designing of new organizations to do specific jobs in particular social or technical environments" (Rice and Bishoprick, 1971, p. 194). They present the various theories on a continuum or spectrum with the left end of the continuum representing autocracy and the right end representing egalitarianism or the belief that cooperative effort among people is a natural characteristic, automatic, persistent and productive. In the move from left to right, they describe the machine model, bureaucracy, systems, decentralization, collegialism, federations, and egalitarianism. The shift from autocracy to egalitarianism is accompanied by another important shift, namely, the shift in theory which recognizes that the appropriate organizational form may be any one of these according to whether it fits the situation or is the organizational scheme most appropriate for the job to be done. Nevertheless, Rice and Bishoprick favor the conceptual scheme which emphasizes the egalitarian, cooperative, collegial approach which enhances human self-worth, rather than the autocratic "machine model" which relegates persons to the level of things.

As I said at the outset, I readily agree with the common affirmation of these authors, namely, the affirmation of the significance of the interpersonal dimension in the managerial-administrative milieu. The problem which I find with all of them, however, is that they merely mention the significance of the personal dimension and do not examine, in any detail, either the groundwork for such an approach or the implications of such an understanding. Even Likert, who explicitly formulates the Principle of Supportive Relationships, does not delineate what the application of such a principle would presuppose on the one hand or entail relative to managerial relations on the other. Neither the presuppositions, the description, nor the entailment of the adoption of a person centered theory of managerial-administrative theory is explicitly considered by any of these authors. Yet, all of them speak of the importance of such considerations.

These observations bring me back to the beginning of my thoughts. My position is that the relational theories of Paul Tillich and Martin Buber, both existentialist philosophical-theologians, can contribute the specific analysis of interpersonal relations the necessity of which is entailed but never provided by the theorists who affirm the significance of the personalistic dimension in leadership theory. The purpose of the following examination is to explore this contention.

Martin Buber's Relational Theory

Martin Buber's theory of reality is relational throughout. For him, all reality is dyadic. In I and Thou, he affirms that "In the beginning is relation" (Buber, 1958, p. 18).¹ The first sentences of I and Thou summarize Buber's ontology, and contain the subject of what he will explicate in the rest of his book. His words are poetic and concise:

To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude.

The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks.

The primary words are not isolated words, but combined words.

The one primary word is the combination I-Thou.

The other primary word is the combination I-It; wherein, without a change in the primary word, one of the words He and She can replace It.

Hence the I of man is also twofold.

For the I of the primary word I-Thou is a different I from that of the primary word I-It.

Primary words do not signify things, but they intimate relations.

Primary words do not describe something that might exist independently of them, but being spoken they bring about existence (Buber, p. 3).

Buber's stress is dyadic, which is to say that he would oppose any attempt to locate the primary reality in one entity, whether it be an individual substance, an individual law, or even an individual superior being.² If Buber were arguing systematically, he would no doubt affirm that the reality which we experience in the everyday world of our lives is always relational. There is no such thing as an isolated individual, unrelated to something or someone. Since the reality we experience is relational, then the basic reality must be relational. Reality, then, is never monadic; it is always diadic. As Buber observes:

There is no I taken in itself, but only the I of the primary word I-Thou and the I of the primary word I-It. When a man says I he refers to one or other of these. The I to which he refers is present when he says I. Further, when he says Thou or It, the I of one of the two primary words is present (Buber, p. 43).

¹Most of Buber's writings, and all of them on ontology, emphasize the dyadic relational character of reality. Cf. e.g.: Between Man and Man and The Knowledge of Man.

²This, of course, opposes any of traditional philosophy's attempts from the pre-Socratics--Thales, Heraclitus, Parmenides, et al--through Plato, Aristotle and on to modern philosophy, to locate ultimate reality in one being.

Buber, then, describes reality as always being relational, and relational reality is of two different kinds, namely, "I-It" relations and "I-Thou" relations. These two relations arise in three spheres. First, there is man's relation within nature. Buber describes our life with nature: "There the relation sways in gloom, beneath the level of speech. Creatures live and move over against us, but cannot come to us, and when we address them as Thou, our words cling to the threshold of speech" (Buber, p. 6). The second relation is our relation with man. Buber describes this relation as "open and in the form of speech." In this relation, "we can give and accept Thou" (Buber, p. 6). The third sphere of relation is "our life with spiritual beings," which Buber describes as "clouded, yet it discloses itself" (Buber, p. 6). This is the realm of the eternal and unconditioned Thou who is the ground of all relations. Our consideration in this presentation will concentrate on the first two spheres of relation, and will consider the distinction between the two.

The relational world of It is basically man's relation with things, with objects. Objects or things can be used; they are at man's disposal. He may use things, and discard them virtually at will (Cf. I and Thou, pp. 39, 40, 43, 60). Things do not respond to man as persons do. Hence, man's relation to things could be described as non-responsive, non-reciprocal and "dead." Since there is no response from the world of things, the It relationship is static, predictable and limited. It is repetitive or "closed" and does not involve novelty or surprise. Since it is closed, and since the It relation permits the entertainment of only limited possibilities, it can be described as "finished" (Buber, p. 58). Moreover, the It can be manipulated, for since it does not respond, it doesn't "stand over against us" either as a reciprocal challenge or as a threat. It does not confront us as a being-in-itself. It is not an end, but rather a means.

The Thou relation is describable in terms of the polar opposite of the It relation. Whereas the It relation is described as a relation with things or objects, the Thou relation is a relation involving subjects. The Thou is not to be used; it is not at our disposal; and it cannot be discarded as can the It. In relation to this understanding, Buber observes: "If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to him, he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things" (Buber, p. 8).

The Thou relation is always a relation between subjects. In the Thou relationship, therefore, there is response, mutuality and reciprocity. The Thou relation is mutual while the It relation does not comprise mutuality (Buber, p. 15). In Buber's words: "The man who has become conscious of I, that is the man who says I-It, stands before things, but not over against them in the flow of mutual action" (Buber, p. 29). This indicates another dimension of the I-Thou relation, namely, the Thou limits us and "stands over against us" in a way in which the It does not. The Thou relation is not manipulative.

Whereas the It relation can be described as closed, static, "dead," predictable, and repetitive (Buber, p. 58); the Thou relation can be

described as open, dynamic, "living," unpredictable, and novel (Buber, pp. 88, 74). As Buber describes the situation: "But the world of Thou is not closed. He who goes out to it with concentrated being and risen power to enter into relation becomes aware of freedom. And to be freed from belief that there is no freedom is indeed to be free" Buber, (p. 58).

This reference to freedom points to the unlimited dimension of the Thou relation as contrasted with the limited nature of the It relation. Buber refers to the unlimited characteristic of the Thou when he says: "When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing for his object. For where there is a thing there is another thing. Every It is bounded by others: It exists only through being bounded by others. But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds" (Buber, p. 4). Hence, although the It relation is limited, static, and "finished," in the sense that the It offers only a limited number of possible relational alternatives, the Thou relation is unlimited, for both partners in the relation are in constant, dynamic, change. As a result, the Thou relation is never closed, for novel possibilities continuously arise. The It to which one relates is always the same It, even though it may be viewed from different perspectives or intentions. The Thou to whom one relates is always in some way an ever changing Thou. The Thou cannot be captured or concretized.

A final distinction between the It and the Thou relation has to do with the epistemological differentiation between the two. The way of knowing the It is different from the way of knowing the Thou. When one has knowledge of It, he has objective knowledge derived on the basis of sense data or some quantifiable or measurable criteria. One "knows about" something, and the something neither contributes the knowledge nor hampers the derivation of knowledge. An It, an object, can be observed, analyzed; its weight, color, dimensions, and density can be known without its contributing any data whatsoever. Moreover, the object cannot "hide itself" or prohibit the observer from obtaining such knowledge about it. The epistemological relation with the Thou is quite different. We can really know another Thou if--and only if--he chooses to reveal himself or give knowledge of himself to us. He may reveal himself or choose to hide himself from us. Knowledge of the Thou is dependent upon the Thou's choosing to share himself. Knowledge of the It, just like the It itself, is at our disposal, and the It does not actively contribute to the knowing situation.

Buber's anthropology, then, describes reality as dyadic. Primary reality is not monadic; it cannot be reduced to one solitary substance or reality. Reality is relational, and the relations consist of either I-It relations or I-Thou relations. One must have I-It relations, but without the person-to-person meeting in the I-Thou relation, one never becomes a person, a Thou. This is summed up in Buber's words, which serve as a summary of Buberian philosophical anthropology: "without It man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not a man" (Buber, p. 34). The importance of this insight for Buber is such that he affirms: "All real living is meeting" (Buber, p. 11).

Paul Tillich's Relational Theory

Paul Tillich develops a systematic relational schema quite similar to that of Buber. Although Tillich develops this schema relative to a Christian understanding of existence and specifically relative to his Christological understanding, it nevertheless lends itself to applicability as a non-religious or secular understanding of existential relationships.¹

In the second volume of his Systematic Theology, Tillich delineates his relational theory for the specific reason of explaining why Jesus came to be accepted as the Messiah and was designated as "the Christ." Tillich then applies the categories to Christian existence. Although there is no question that Tillich's approach is legitimate within the Christian milieu, I am, for the purposes of this study, demythologizing Tillich's theory and presenting it as a general relational theory. My thesis, then, is that Tillich's Christological theory can be secularized and used legitimately as a non-religious relational theory, and, as such, can be applied to management theory. Therefore, I will not consider Tillich's complex and systematic Christological analysis. Rather, I refer to it as a basis for a non-religious relational theory. My emphasis is upon the fact that Tillich's relational theory is valid whether or not one approaches it from a Christian viewpoint. In other words, its applicability does not presuppose a Christian orientation, no more than does Buber's theory presuppose a Jewish world-view.

Just as Buber views the relational possibilities of man as twofold, so also does Tillich. Tillich describes the basic relational possibilities under the categories of "Estrangement" and "Reconciliation." When man acts in relation to others--and all his actions are in some way "in relation"--his actions constitute either relations of estrangement or relations of reconciliation of unity. Man tends to act from self-centeredness which isolates him from other men, and hence estranges him from others since he is wrapped up in himself rather than reaching out to the other.

Tillich's Christological explanation is that the man Jesus comes to be accepted as the Christ because he always acts from a reconciling or unifying dynamic rather than an estranging dynamic. Jesus was a man who came to be viewed as "the Christ" or "the Messiah" because of

¹Note that my use of Tillich's Christological analysis is to be demythologized and secularized. This is not an attempt to approach the problem of the administration of complex organizations from a religious standpoint.

I also believe Albert Camus, coming from an atheistic and existentialist position--just as Tillich comes from an existentialist, but theistic orientation--could be utilized in conjunction with Buber and Tillich, but such an inclusion is beyond the scope of this presentation. The consideration of Camus would be an interesting topic for study at a later time.

the way he related both to God and to his fellowmen (Tillich, 1958, pp. 98-117).

For the purposes of this presentation, the primary significance of Tillich's delineation is not Christological, but rather a consideration of Tillich's description of the two basic relations. I merely use Tillich's understanding—not Christologically—but anthropologically, that is, in a non-religious way as constitutive of a general theory of relation.

In Tillich's understanding, relations of estrangement in which the actions lead to the separating of persons from one another are characterized by the dynamics of "unbelief," "hubris," and "concupiscence" or lust. (Tillich, pp. 47-51). The relation of reconciliation is characterized by the polar opposites of these, namely, "faith" or "trust," "surrender" (of aggressiveness), and "agape," respectively. The former ways of relating engender separation, while the latter foster reunion, reconciliation or "at-oneness."

What did Tillich mean by these concepts? In answering this question, I will not apply the concepts to man's relation to God, as Tillich did. Rather, I will indicate what Tillich meant by these, and apply them to human interpersonal relations, an application which Tillich does not specifically make since his interest is primarily theological. Their significance lies in the fact that, as I have said, they can be applied existentially to human relations.

The first concept which Tillich considers under the category of Estrangement is estrangement as "unbelief." Tillich defines unbelief when he says: "'Unbelief' for Protestant Christianity means the act or state in which man in the totality of his being turns away from God" (Tillich, p. 47). If this is applied to interpersonal relations, the act of unbelief would be that of a person "in the totality of his being" turning away from another person. Unbelief toward another person means that the person, so acting, has no faith in the other's possibilities. He is closed to the potential in the other. Instead of trust, he demands proof. Instead of acceptance, he is aloof, requires evidence or collateral, and is legalistic. This attitude in itself engenders estrangement. The dynamic of unbelief separates persons from one another and makes them estranged, i.e. as strangers to one another. (Tillich, pp. 47-49).

The polar opposite of the dynamics of unbelief is that of faith or trust. The relation of trust opens the person to the other's possibilities, does not demand proof or evidence, is not legalistic or contractual. It assumes the risk of acceptance. Such a relational dynamic, by its very action, gives birth to unified, "at-one" relations.

The second concept under the category of estrangement is "hubris." Coming from the Greek, "hubris" has no exact English equivalent. Theologically, "hubris" refers to the self-elevation of man into the sphere of the divine. Tillich describes "hubris" when he says:

If a man does not acknowledge . . . the fact that he is excluded from the infinity of the gods --he falls into hubris. . . . Hubris is not one form of sin beside others. It is sin in its total form, namely, the other side of unbelief or man's turning away from the divine center to which he belongs. It is turning toward one's self as the center of one's self and one's world. This turning toward one's self is not an act done by a special part of man, such as his spirit. Man's whole life, including his sensual life, is spiritual. And it is in the totality of his personal being that man makes himself the center of his world. This is hubris . . . (Tillich, pp. 50-51).

Transferring Tillich's understanding to the secular plain, one may describe hubris as the tendency on the part of man to elevate himself not merely as the center of himself, but as the center of the whole world. As such, he views everyone and everything from his own standpoint and expects everyone else to see everything from his standpoint. The estrangement-producing dynamic of this stance is self-evident. It sets the person up as the absolute, solitary center. It is an act of self-elevation which separates the person from everyone else. The dynamic which overcomes "hubris" is man's surrender of his aggressiveness,¹ his denial of attempts to be the center of the whole universe. He surrenders his aggressive will to be the center and in so doing overcomes his isolation and opens himself up to interpersonal relations of mutuality with the other.

The third and final concept descriptive of the dynamic of estrangement is that of "concupiscence" or "lust." "Concupiscence" is man's attempt to possess, control, and own everything which comes under his province. Tillich describes this tendency in man when he says:

The possibility of reaching unlimited abundance is the temptation of man who is a self and has a world. The classical name for this desire is concupiscentia "concupiscence"--the unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality into one's self. It refers to all aspects of man's relation to himself and his world. It refers to physical hunger as well as to sex, to knowledge as

¹To clarify this stance, one should differentiate between aggressive and assertive behavior. Aggression may be viewed as activity in which one attempts to affirm himself by infringing upon or denying the self of the other. Assertive behavior, on the other hand, would be self-affirmative action which did not infringe upon the other. Aggressive behavior would be destructive of the other; assertive behavior would be affirmative of the self while not being destructive of the other. The former (i.e. aggressive behavior) would constitute "hubris," while the latter would be creative for the person so acting, and, in fact necessary for the person's life and development.

well as to power, to material wealth as well as to spiritual values. (Tillich, p. 52).

Again, as in the case of "hubris" the estranging dynamic is self-evident. The person whose central concern is to control, use, own, or have power over the other, by this very concern estranges himself from the other. He treats the other as an It, to be used, manipulated, and controlled. In so doing, he negates real personal relation.

Buber's and Tillich's Relational Theories as Complementary

Tillich's relational theology, viewed from the horizontal, anthropological standpoint, describes the two possible relations which man may have. Relations of estrangement or separation are describable in terms of "unbelief," "hubris," and "concupiscence," while their opposites, relations of "at-oneness" are characterized by faith or trust, surrender of aggressiveness, and "agape" or concern for the welfare of the other. While the former deny relation and set the individual off from relation among people, the latter enhance relation and unify people.

The two types of relations which Tillich describes are analogous to Buber's two relations. Tillich's relation of separation or estrangement is analogous to Buber's I-It relation. His relation of reconciliation or "at-onement" is analogous to Buber's I-Thou relation. Taken together, the two relational theories support and enhance one another.

For the purposes of summary and clarification, the two views can be schematized as follows:

Relations of Estrangement (I-It) (Separation)

Unbelief
"Hubris"
"Concupiscence" (Lust)
Use
At disposal
Discard
No mutuality
No reciprocity
Doesn't respond
Doesn't stand over against
Manipulative
Closed
Static
"Dead"
Predictable/repetitive
Limited
"Finished"
Knew about

Relations of Reconciliation (I-Thou) (At-oneness)

Faith/Trust
Surrender of aggressiveness
"Agape"
Not subject to use
Not at our disposal
Cannot discard
Mutual relations
Reciprocal relations
Responsive
Limits/Stands over against
Not manipulative
Open
Dynamic
"Living"
Unpredictable/Novel
Unlimited/No bounds
Lasting/Continuous
Know

Implications for Administration and Program Management

Martin Buber and Paul Tillich are examples of those whose thought and writing evidence the significance of human relations as being all-pervasive. Tillich, no less than Buber, would say, "In the beginning is relation" (Buber, p. 18) and "All real living is meeting" (Buber, p. 11). To delineate Buber's and Tillich's understanding of the two types of relations was one task of this presentation. Such an analysis itself is warranted merely for the contribution it makes to the understanding and analysis of relationships in administration and management. Having studied Buber's and Tillich's thought, the administrator, both as a private person and in the role of administrator may well use these concepts in evaluating his own relations. One may assume, however, that the development of "I-Thou" relations or "At-onement" relations may well be a laudable attempt for a person's personal, i.e. non-professional, relations. But is it even possible, or if it is possible, is it even worthwhile to attempt to develop I-Thou relations in administrative affairs while simultaneously working to avoid the "thingifying" I-It relations of separation and estrangement which are so often characteristic of manager--employee, administrator--faculty, or even faculty--faculty relations? The answer to this question has been given an unequivocal "yes" by the management theorists examined in this presentation.

The connection between relational theory and management and administrative theory should be self-evident, for if as Morse and Lorsch, Rice and Bishoprick, Likert, Argyris, McGregor, Bass, Reddin, and others have observed, administration and management are relation intensive (what I have called "person-centered") rather than task oriented, then any relational theory will contribute, either positively or negatively, to one's understanding of administration. And this understanding will evidence itself in action.

What specifically does this have to do with the management of federal programs? First, the administrator of a program or project which is designed to be of service to persons should be exemplary in demonstrating that persons are of value, and this cannot be done for clients when one is so task oriented that the program personnel are reduced to the status of things. At a minimum the organization should avoid the hierarchical approach to management, an avoidance which is difficult at best when the federal officers evidence almost total ignorance of any managerial style which is not bureaucratic, if not autocratic. A desired state of affairs would be that of a collegial organizational structure in which each participant worked as colleagues with others contributing within his or her own sphere of expertise and responsibility, a structure in which ideas are shared, developed, and implemented with little care given concerning "who reports to whom," but with the main concern being that of helping the clients in the best possible ways.

Second, organizational administration based on trust, surrender of aggressiveness, and "agape" or concern for the other person's welfare,

that is to say, administration in which persons are valued over things, itself serves as the embodiment of the value of persons. Such an organization does not merely talk of the value of persons, it demonstrates that value. A demonstration, an embodiment, of a value is incalculably superior to mere talk of such values. In contrast, hierarchically ordered organizations by their very structure deny the importance of person-centered values and contradict by their very existence any assertions they may make which attempt to affirm such values. Every individual is pigeon-holed into a category and, in essence, the bureaucracy says: We have no time for the individual differences, no time for you as a person, we follow policy. On the contrary, person-centered management attempts to relate to each person as an individual person with individual needs, strengths, aspirations, and contributions, and this should be true no less for the employees than it is for the clients.

Third, person-centered management provides optimum possibilities for developing programs which are holistic in their attempts to contribute to human growth and welfare. Person-centered management considers all organizational constituents--managers, non-managers, clients, all associated with the organization--as whole persons, and attempts to relate to them as such. Likert's Principle of Supportive Relationships is embodied in such an organization so that the persons involved, regardless of their involvement, consider their own personal worth to be enhanced through their association with the organization, the employees as they fulfill their potential in opportunities for service to others and personal growth, and the clients whose worth is affirmed both by those who serve them with personal concern for their welfare and by the fact that they are becoming able to develop their own potential for becoming, for fulfillment, for independent growth, and, eventually, the development in themselves of the power to give and to contribute.

Finally, a bureaucratic, hierarchically structured organization is essentially an organization of I-It relations. I am not naive enough to expect that we can rid ourselves of bureaucracy. Yet, we can work to put it in its proper perspective. Person centered management constantly remembers that the organization's reason for being is to serve the needs of people, to enhance human value, potential, and resources. Persons do not exist for the organization; the organization exists for persons. The I-It relations of bureaucracy are put in their proper perspective by recalling Buber's caution: "Without It man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not a man" (Buber, p. 34).

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